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Spain’s economic problems are not being helped by
attempts to disguise debt in official figures.
by Blog Admin
This week Spain formally requested 39.5 billion euros of European funds to recapitalise
Spanish banks. Luis Garicano writes that one of the key issues exacerbating Spain’s
economic crisis is the tendency to disguise debt in official figures. He argues that in several
areas of the Spanish economy it is better to accept money has been lost, rather than spend
further funds simply to maintain an appearance of sustainability.
Suppose you run a business and have a customer, company X, which owes you money
and has already been given several def errals on its promises to pay. You investigate and
discover that the customer is in no condition to pay at all. Company X comes back to your shop and asks
f or yet more credit in order to keep on buying. It would seem obvious, surely, that you will tell it  to get
lost and that on no account will you give it more credit?
In our f inancial crisis (just as in Japan´s earlier crisis) this logic does not hold: it is precisely troubled
institutions which  tend to f ollow the opposite reasoning. For example, if  customer X is a real estate
developer, the bank thinks: if  I do not extend his credit, I have to declare a bad debt and make provisions,
which will use up what lit t le capital I have. Theref ore, it would be better to give the developer more money,
maintain that the loan is a “good” one, and keep going “t ill things get better.” And so the economy is
controlled by zombie banks, which appear to be alive but are in f act dead and use up the capital which
should be going to businesses, especially exporters, which could get the economy going again.
Well, this logic, which has caused so
much damage to the f inancial system
and the Spanish economy, is also
applied at government level, in Spain and
in Europe. The Government´s main
concern, shared by the press, is whether
such and such an expenditure item
“counts” as part of  the def icit. How
Eurostat calculates the def icit
(unf ortunately, quite badly, because it
does not deal very well with contingent
obligations, company debt or Social
Security, see this Banco de España
document) af f ects the excessive debt
procedure, and that matters, of  course,
but what is ult imately important is f or the
debt to be sustainable, and hidden debt
does af f ect sustainability. Unf ortunately much has been done to disguise the truth, of ten contrary to
economic logic. If  we lose our credibility in order to get the numbers to “work out” then all the ef f ort will
have been in vain. And there are reasons to believe that the Government is so obsessed with the
numbers that it is pushing the limits of  what is reasonable.
1. The bailout of the f inancial system has been carried out in the least transparent manner possible,
just so that it will not “count”, using guaranteed debt (see the sums involved), asset protection schemes
and ECB money against collateral f rom the f inancial system which is however guaranteed by the Banco
de España. For example, in the case of  Bankia, as we discussed in May, bef ore the Spanish taxpayer was
even aware of  the problem, it was already too late because the total explicit and implicit guarantees given
by the State, the Deposit Guarantee Fund (FGD) and the Banco de España totalled 250 billion euros.
These guarantees were cheerf ully handed out as if  the banks only had liquidity problems when they were
in f act insolvent. Just as the banks granted credit extensions to the developers so as not to have to
f ace reality, the state was granting the f inancial institutions a lif eline f or the same purpose.
2. The energy tariff  deficit , totalling 30 billion euros by the end of  the year, is another example of  how
we cheat at solitaire. The “liberalised” market generated high prices, but nobody wanted to f righten the
taxpayers. So, instead of  changing the system or accepting the higher prices, f rom the year 2000 the
electricity companies were granted the “right” to recover the tarif f  def icit, which is the dif f erence between
what energy was worth according to the “market” and what the consumers actually paid, and so they
were allowed to issue securit ies (you know what is coming, don´t you?), guaranteed by the state (to a
total value of  20 billion, of  which 13 billion have already been issued and 7 billion are still to come)
against f uture earnings which would be charged to the energy consumers. Again this is a debt that does
not “count” and so everybody is happy: the electricity company managers show a “prof it” with no cash
f low, the polit icians avoid f rightening the consumers, and the def icit keeps piling up. Only a system as
opaque as this one could lead to a situation where out of  every 100 euros in subsidies granted f or
renewable energy in the world, 15 are handed out in Spain, as César Molinas told us. Note that this
hidden def icit is the worst of  all possible worlds, because consumers are not aware of  the costs they
are really incurring, and so have no incentive to save, while companies are earning much more than they
should. What is the result? The costs of  the “liberalised” system have risen f rom 6.75 billion in 2004 to
17.13 billion in 2011, while revenue has increased f rom 7.16 billion to 13.28 billion, according to El
Economista.
3. The SAREB. The SAREB (the ‘bad bank’ created in Spain to process unrecoverable loans), as Tano
explained so wonderf ully, is another example of  the obsession with making sure things “don’t count”,
instead of  doing things right f or once. Yet again, we minimise what we ask f or f rom the EU in order to
limit the debt. We ask f or too litt le, and so enable the real estate developers to emerge clean and shining
and f ree of  debt (in the case of  real estate developers, a deed in lieu of  f oreclosure IS legal) but not the
ordinary cit izens. Moreover, pure (guaranteed!) debt is used to pay f or it and the SAREB is highly
leveraged so that most of  its capital is private, so that it seems that the risk is private. In f act the risk is
all borne by the kind Spanish taxpayer. Ah, but that does not “count”, because all the Spanish state has
contributed is (as the smart reader has already grasped) the guarantees!
What is even more galling is that our dear developer, whose welf are has been the top priority of  our
economic policy f or the past f ive (or rather 15) years, will be ref inanced by the SAREB. Please look at
page 11 of  SAREB’s blueprint because it is enough to make you weep. “Sareb, under specif ic conditions,
may advance additional f inancing to a debtor so as to improve recoveries and the value of  the assets.”
And, “Sareb will work actively with all debtors and will engage in consensual restructuring, ref inancing or
termination of  loans, based on what the optimal commercial strategy is. However, this will be subject to
debtors being cooperative, transparent and realistic.”
In other words, in theory we are to believe that if  we give these gentlemen in arrears just a litt le more of
that money Spain does not have, then they will f inish the house they have been building f or the past f ive
years, which of  course will be a wonderf ul house and, unlike the other million and a half , it  will be sellable.
Not only that, but despite these gentlemen´s excellent polit ical connections and their seat in the
executive box at the Bernabeu stadium, the management at SAREB will use strict technical criteria when it
comes to handing out the money. Well, I am sorry, but we do not believe it. That is what we were told f ive
years ago by CCM, f our years ago by Caja Sur and three years ago by Bancaja and CAM, and look how
they ended up. The SAREB cannot be used to keep f inancing the construction industry moguls at the
expense of  the productive economy. It is not a matter of  ref inancing them “in order not to lose money”.
The money has already been lost. It is a matter of  not admitt ing that the money has already been lost.
4. The Social Security accounts. There is a serious structural problem with the social security
accounts, which must be recognised and resolved. At the moment, there are two workers paying towards
each pension, which means we are at the limit of  what is sustainable. The Social Security def icit will reach
10 billion euros this year (when there was a surplus of  9 billion in 2009). Moreover, Spain´s demographic
f uture is dif f icult. But two instruments are being used to give an appearance of  sustainability: the state is
“paying” the Social Security contributions f or the unemployed (by moving money f rom one account to
another) and it is using 7.5 billion f rom the reserve f unds. Here again, the problem is not just that the
truth is disguised, but that in so doing, it leads to bad decisions being taken on the pension increases
which would make the system more sustainable, and to postpone f acing up to the structural reality.
5. Greece . Greece is insolvent. Nobody in the private or public sector has come up with a model to the
contrary. They are not going to pay the debt and, as the IMF admits, relief  is going to have to be agreed.
However, the creditor countries, including Spain, are going to give them more money to ref inance the
debt and avoid a declaration of  bankruptcy, against the wishes of  the Fund. The money has already been
lost, and the f act that we do not wish to admit it in our bookkeeping will not change this hard f act. But
ref using to admit reality is costing Spain and Europe a lot of  money, and a lot of  suf f ering is imposed on
the Greek cit izens who have to keep on working under a huge weight of  debt they can never cast of f , as
they know perf ectly well.
One of  the things that those of  us who teach economics most emphasise to our students is the
dif f erence between economic and accounting prof its. There are many decisions which might make sense
f rom an accounting point of  view, but make no sense in the real world of  business and so should not be
taken. This principle also applies to states. Let us stop worrying about what “counts” and “does not
count” and try to take decisions in the interests of  everyone´s welf are in the medium and long term.
This article was originally posted on Nada es Gratis.
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